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Abstract. Mobile messaging services have gained a large share in global telecom-
munications. Unlike conventional services like phone calls, text messages or
email, they do not feature a standardized environment enabling a federated and
potentially local service architecture. We present an extensive and large-scale
analysis of communication patterns for four popular mobile messaging services
between 28 countries and analyze the locality of communication and the resulting
impact on user privacy. We show that server architectures for mobile messaging
services are highly centralized in single countries. This forces messages to dras-
tically deviate from a direct communication path, enabling hosting and transfer
countries to potentially intercept and censor traffic. To conduct this work, we
developed a measurement framework to analyze traffic of such mobile messag-
ing services. It allows to conduct automated experiments with mobile messaging
applications, is transparent to those applications and does not require any modi-
fications to the applications.
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1 Introduction
Mobile messaging services like WeChat or WhatsApp see a steady increase in both ac-
tive users and messages sent, with a particular success in emerging markets like China,
Brazil or Malaysia [18, 30]. Some researchers predict a shift in communication para-
digms with mobile messaging services eradicating classical forms of electronic com-
munication like email or text messages. As an example, the number of text messages
sent in Germany shrunk by 62% from 2012 to 2014 [5], after it had been growing ex-
ponentially for over a decade.
Mobile messaging services and their design strongly differ from classic Internet
communication services: established means of communication—like email, internet
telephony or instant messaging—often rely on federated or decentralized architectures,
with operators providing services to their customers and from within their domain.
Mobile messaging services tend to abandon established principles of openness and
federation: messaging services are often realized in a closed, non-federated, cloud-
centric environment built upon proprietary communication and security protocols nei-
ther standardized nor disclosed to the public.
This paradigm shift puts at risk the user’s freedom and access to secure, confidential
and privacy-preserving communication. With such services, the user—relating to her
social network through such applications—strongly depends on the service provider to
not modify or restrict the service. The user’s privacy also depends on the legislation
the operating company is subject to: governments are often interested in controlling
Internet services [13, 31] and accessing messages [8] as well as metadata. The matters
of security and privacy move along the same lines and generally involve a full trust into
a closed system, a misleading assumption as we saw with WhatApp’s announced end-
to-end-encryption, which is supported on Android, but not Apple devices [1], without
giving feedback on encryption status to the user. First attempts to analyze the security
properties of mobile messaging services have for example been made by the EFF with
its Secure Messaging Scorecard [3].
In this work, we analyze the implications of mobile messaging services on the users
and their privacy. Similar to the discussion about a “nation-centric Internet” [32], we set
out to understand the communication behavior and patterns of mobile messaging ser-
vices by analyzing how local messaging traffic is from a geographic and legal point of
view. We analyze how messaging traffic is routed through the Internet and which coun-
tries could therefore access this traffic. We compare this path with the direct communi-
cation path which could have been taken between communication partners to quantify
the impact of mobile messaging services. For this analysis, we developed an analy-
sis platform and testbed for mobile applications, called MATAdOR (Mobile Applica-
tion Traffic Analysis plattfORm). We use MATAdOR to exchange messages between a
large number of communication partners distributed over the world using different mo-
bile messaging applications and automatically extract information about the network
path the messages used.
2 Related Work
Several projects worked on analyzing the behavior and communication patterns of mo-
bile messaging services and the challenges arising when conducting automated experi-
ments with mobile devices and applications.
Fiadino et al. [6] investigated characteristics of WhatsApp communication based
on a set of mobile network trace data from February 2014. In this set, they identified
every DNS request to WhatsApp and resolved them in a distributed way through the
RIPE Atlas service. They found the corresponding address to be exclusively located in
the U.S. and focussed further on Quality of Experience analysis. Huang et al. [9] did
similar work on WeChat, using network traces as well as controlled experiments. For
the latter, they connected phones through WLAN, but relied on heavy manual work
for message sending and traffic analysis. They do not mention a capability to proxy
traffic out through remote nodes. On the collected data, they heavily focus on dissect-
ing the protocol and architecture. Mueller et al. [15] researched security for a wide set
of mobile messaging services and found many weaknesses, e.g. on the authentication
bootstrapping process. They used a testbed similar to MATAdOR, but had to explic-
itly configure the mobile device’s proxy settings. Frosch et al. [7] provided a detailed
protocol analysis for TextSecure based on its source code. Anthropological studies like
O’Hara et al. [16] mainly focus on the content of messages and their implications on
social life, usually featuring small trace sets or interview data and not data generated
from automated testbeds.
The life cycle of network experiments, automated experimentation and testbed man-
agement is in the focus of several related projects. The OpenLab Project1 focuses on
improving network experimentation for future distributed and federated testbeds and
to provide tools to researchers. Various tools for supporting testbed setup and experi-
mentation exist [19], but many are outdated or unavailable. None of these tools support
experimentation with mobile devices or geographic diversion of network traffic.
[33] provides an extensive list of commercial platforms aiming to integrate func-
tional mobile application testing in the software development cycle. Many platforms
support the use of real devices and some even provide testing over mobile carrier net-
works to ensure functionality. Many solutions are only provided as a paid service.
3 Analyzing Communication of Mobile Messaging Applications
In order to analyze the impact of mobile messaging services on traffic locality, our ap-
proach is to compare the network path, defined as direct network path between commu-
nication partners obtained with forward path measurements, and the application path,
defined as the forward path measurements from both partners to the mobile messaging
service’s backend infrastructure.
We use the MATAdOR testbed to send a large number of messages using differ-
ent mobile messaging services between communication partners distributed all over the
globe. To do so, we use MATAdOR equipped with two mobile devices and the mobile
messaging application under test. MATAdOR tunnels the application traffic to Planet-
Lab nodes as depicted in Figure 1. We intercept the applications’ communication and
extract the communication endpoints. Based on this information, we conduct forward
path measurements to the mobile messaging service’s backend servers to obtain the
application path and between the nodes to obtain the network path.
We map the hops in both application path and network path to countries and analyze
which jurisdictions and political frameworks the traffic traverses on its way between
communication partners. As a result, we can give a qualified analysis how much the
application path and the network path differ and if traffic is confined to a geographic
region when both partners are located in this region.
3.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup of MATAdOR consists of a dedicated controller node, two
WLAN routers, two Android mobile phones and the PlanetLab proxy nodes as depicted
1 http://www.ict-openlab.eu
in Figure 1. The controller node orchestrates the overall experimentation process, con-
figures the WLAN routers, configures the Android devices and instruments them to
send messages. Device instrumentation is realized using the Android Debug Bridge to
configure network connections, start applications, and issue input events to the devices
to automate message sending. The routers spawn two wireless networks and establish
tunnels to the respective PlanetLab nodes. The router’s task is to route, intercept and
modify traffic as well as to automatically parse network traces and start path measure-
ments to targets. To leverage PlanetLab for this experiment, we use a tool currently
under development at our chair. This tool is able to transparently proxy traffic over
PlanetLab nodes. It is currently in beta status and pending public release.
Fig. 1. Overall experiment design.
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Mobile Phone Configuration To run the mobile messaging applications, we use
two off-the-shelf, rooted Motorola Moto-E (2nd generation) smartphones running vanilla
Android 5.0.2. For each device, we created an individual Google Play account. To allow
control through the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), devices are connected to the con-
troller using USB. We use XPrivacy2 to set the phone’s location information accord-
ing to the location of the specific PlanetLab node and iptables to restrict network
communication to the specific mobile messaging application under test. To prevent ge-
olocation based on mobile network information, the phones were set to airplane mode
with only WLAN enabled. Router Configuration Two GNU/Linux PCs, configured to
act as WLAN access points, provide two dedicated WPA2-protected wireless networks,
one to each mobile phone. Through DHCP, they provide RFC 1918 private address and
the PlanetLab node’s DNS server to the phones. The routers use tcpdump to intercept
traffic and scapy to automatically process network traces.
Measurement Orchestration The measurements to conduct are defined as exper-
iments. Within each experiment, MATAdOR executes the respective set of commands.
This involves setting up remote tunnels to two PlanetLab nodes, configuring the net-
work settings on the routers according to the experiment, starting interception and ma-
nipulation software on the routers, configure the phone to use the wireless network,
setting XPrivacy and firewall settings on the phone, capturing the phone’s screen for
later inspection, stepping through the experiment on the phones with ADB automation,
parsing the network trace data automatically, and executing path measurements to all
IP addresses found in the network trace.
2 http://repo.xposed.info/module/biz.bokhorst.xprivacy
Experiment Parametrization To support experimentation with different applica-
tions, all required experimental parameters are controlled through application-specific
configuration files. This includes timers between the different steps of the experiment,
blacklists of hosts not to include in path measurements (e.g. NTP or DNS servers), the
text to send in the messages and how many messages to send with the application. Such
messaging timers, depicted in Figure 2, are controlled through these configuration files.
Experiment Monitoring and Error Handling While running experiments, we
learned that using unaltered applications on physical devices in this complex setup is
prone to errors. We therefore split the overall experiment into smaller junks to be able
to reproduce missing or failing measurements. To be able to detect and analyze failures,
the screen of the mobile devices is captured for each measurement.
Benefits Using the MATAdOR Testbed Our approach minimizes effort and cost
using common available off-the-shelf hardware. Since MATAdOR does not rely on de-
vice or run time emulation, simulated network connections, adapted applications, or
otherwise modifying the devices in an unusual way (e.g. setting an application or de-
vice proxy), the testbed environment is transparent to both the phone and apps and looks
like a “normal” wireless network. All steps within the experiment life cycle have been
automated. This provides the possibility to efficiently scale the number of applications
and experiments. MATAdOR provides functionality to easily and automatically inter-
cept all network traffic. It can also transparently redirect network traffic through hosts
at remote locations, appearing to outsiders and the application itself as if the phone was
located at that place. When proxying the phone’s traffic through a remote location, the
phone’s location services are manipulated accordingly.
3.2 Methodology
The goal of our experiment is to collect information about the path that messages take
on the Internet when two communication partners communicate with each other using
a mobile messaging application. In addition, we want to learn about the regions and
countries a message traverses on its way. To do so, we have to analyze the network path
between both communication partners and the messaging service infrastructure.
In our experiment, we use a set of four carefully selected mobile messaging services
and use their respective applications to exchange messages between the two mobile
phones in our testbed. In a single measurement, we use one specific mobile messaging
application, connect to the mobile messaging service on both phones and exchange mes-
sages between both devices. By doing so, we can extract the communication endpoints
for the mobile messaging service from the network traffic. We can then perform path
measurements to these communication endpoints from both mobile phones to obtain
the network path to the service provider infrastructure. To get a global view on com-
munication, we tunnel traffic through 28 PlanetLab nodes. This way, we can learn the
path messages take for example for a WhatsApp user in Australia communicating with
a user in North America. In addition, we conduct direct path measurements between
both respective PlanetLab nodes to obtain the direct network path.
For the path measurements, we use the standard traceroute tool provided with
GNU/Linux. From the network traces, we extract the protocol (i.e. TCP or UDP) and
port number (e.g. 443) the mobile messaging service uses and apply these settings to
measure the network path to the mobile messaging service infrastructure. To obtain the
path between nodes, we use traceroute with TCP and a random high port.
Selection of Applications For this work, we carefully selected four different mobile
messaging services based on different characteristics depicted in Table 1.
Based on their popularity, we picked WhatsApp and WeChat as the two mobile
messaging services built for mobile chat. Due to its high rank in the EFF Scorecard
with respect to security and privacy and being free software with its source code open
to the public, we picked TextSecure as a third application for this experiment. We chose
Threema for its promise of servers based in Switzerland and claim of strong privacy
for the users. In addition, Threema is one of the few European-based providers. Since
all of the previous solutions rely on a centralized client/server architecture, we select
Bleep as a fifth candidate due to its decentralized peer-to-peer architecture. However,
we could not enforce peer-to-peer behavior in our testbed and observed minute-long
delays between messages. We concluded that peer-to-peer architectures require closer
investigation including the use of NAT traversal techniques in our framework. For this
reason, we excluded Bleep from the set of applications.
Table 1. Properties of mobile messaging services and applications.
Application Monthly active EFF Scorecard2 Architecture Server Primary
(Version) users1 [22] Points [3] Distribution mobile
WhatsApp (2.12.176) 800-900mn [11, 23] [27, p.23] 2 client-server n/a X
WeChat (6.2.4) 400-600mn [27, p.22] [26, p.4] n/a client-server n/a X
Facebook3 350-600mn [4], [27, p.22] 2 client-server n/a ✗
Skype 300mn [14] 1 client-server n/a ✗
QQ International 843mn [26, p.4] 2 client-server n/a ✗
Viber 249mn [21] 1 client-server n/a ?
LINE 211mn [12] n/a client-server n/a ?
Kik 200mn4 [25] 1 client-server n/a ?
Tango 70mn [24] n/a client-server n/a ?
KakaoTalk 48mn [2] n/a client-server n/a ?
Yahoo Messenger n/a 1 client-server n/a ✗
TextSecure (2.24.1) >10mn4 [17] 7 client-server global X
Silent Text n/a 7 client-server n/a ?
Telegram 30-50mn [27, p.22] [28] 45 client-server global X
Wickr 4mn6 [20] 5 client-server global ?
Bleep (1.0.616) n/a n/a peer-to-peer n/a ?
FireChat n/a n/a peer-to-peer n/a X
Threema (2.41) 3mn4 [29] 5 client-server Switzerland X
SIMSme 1 mn6 n/a client-server Germany X
1: Around July 30, 2015, for exact date see app-specific source 2: EFF Secure Messaging Scorecard [3]
3: Stand-alone Facebook Messenger 4: Registered users 5: Score of 7 in secure chats 6: App Store Downloads
Node Selection To achieve a global view on messaging communication, we com-
piled a list of PlanetLab nodes providing a wide geographical distribution. The objective
for this list was to cover as many regions and countries as possible. However, Planet-
Lab does not provide equal coverage in all regions and availability of nodes strongly
differs across regions. When we conducted our experiment, PlanetLab featured nodes
in 49 countries, but we only found 28 countries with at least one stable and respon-
sive node, providing good coverage for North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania. For
South America only a single node in Argentina and Brazil was provided, for Africa no
nodes could be accessed at all.
For our experiment, we therefore used 4 nodes in the Americas (North America: 2,
South America: 2), 7 nodes in Asia (Eastern Asia: 4, South-Eastern Asia: 2, Western
Asia: 1), 16 nodes in Europe (Eastern Europe: 3, Northern Europe: 5, Southern Europe:
4, Western Europe: 4) and 2 nodes in Oceania.
Limitations It is important to note that our path measurements only record a country
as being part of a path if a hop from that country replies to path measurements. This can
be biased by (a) nodes not answering those requests and (b) countries being passively
traversed. Especially the latter is relevant, as intelligence services are known to also
wiretap passively. For example, some measurements from Switzerland offer direct paths
to Hong Kong or the U.S., but obviously more countries in between would have passive
access to the cables in-between.
4 Postprocessing Experiment Results
Despite limiting application communication, the resulting network traces included some
irrelevant flows. For this experiment, we solely want to evaluate traffic between the mo-
bile messaging application and the mobile messaging service’s backend. Therefore, we
had to classify network flows and assemble a black- and whitelist of network flows for
exclusion or inclusion. Here, we went through several steps:
First, we limited background traffic by firewalling communication to only allow
mobile messaging application to access the network.Second, we conducted six mea-
surements from America, Europe and Asia without the mobile messaging application
running. This resulted in network traces containing “background noise” we could ex-
clude after manual validation.Third, we manually inspected several dozens of traces per
mobile messaging application to determine additional background traffic. The sources
for this traffic were manually added to the filtering blacklist.Fourth, we separated au-
thentication and other background traffic for every application from messaging traffic
through temporal correlation with message timers.
For Threema, TextSecure and WhatsApp, we found all messaging servers to be
resolved through DNS and to resolve uniformly across the globe, confirming the re-
sults of [6] for WhatsApp. We found WeChat to use both DNS requests and a custom-
built DNS-over-HTTP protocol for name resolution, providing different name resolu-
tion when queried from within or from outside China. This DNS-over-HTTP uses a
30-minute timeout and therefore “contaminates” our name resolution cache, which we
flush after every experiment, typically lasting five to ten minutes. We therefore built
the whitelist for WeChat analysis through manual analysis. The resulting detailed DNS
table can be found online3.
In a last step, we automatically processed all traces and classified all addresses into
this black- or whitelist. For remaining addresses, we manually classified them along the
observed traces and re-ran the classifier until all addresses could be classified.
3 http://www.net.in.tum.de/pub/mobmes/dnstable.pdf
4.1 Mapping Path Measurements to Countries and Regions
To obtain the countries the traffic traverses, both the application path and the network
path were processed to provide a geolocation of the IP addresses. With some manual
corrections, we found the ip2location4 country database to provide the most accurate
results. To not overly rely on that database, we manually validated the mappings in at
least one trace per target subnet and source country. With respect to known inaccuracies
of both reverse DNS labels and geolocation databases, as described in [10,34], we paid
special attention to round-trip times found in forward path measurements.
To analyze locality with respect to a specific geographic region, we used the United
Nations geoscheme5 to assign countries to regions and subregions. This scheme relies
on 5 regions (Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Oceania) which are further divided into
geographic subregions (e.g. for the Americas: Latin America and the Caribbean, Central
America, South America, and Northern America).
4.2 Mapping Countries to Interest Groups
In addition to geographic locality, we analyzed the possibility of several jurisdictions
and similar entities to access the network traffic. In this analysis, we defined several
interest groups and checked for the different mobile messaging services if these interest
groups can access the traffic. For this analysis we defined the following interest groups:
– 5 Eyes consisting of: Great Britain, United States, New Zealand, Canada
– European Union consisting of: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
– Arab League consisting of: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan
– Russia with the only member Russia
– China with the only member China
5 Results
With our experiments, running from Sep 30 2015 to Oct 12 2015, we conducted 406
measurements between the 28 PlanetLab nodes using the 4 selected mobile messaging
services, resulting in 1624 measurements in total.
Table 2 shows the path comparisons between application path and network path. The
first columns evaluate the direct measurements between nodes and show how many %
of measurements failed to stay within the region. We found that all traffic from Israel
to other Asian countries is being routed through Europe and the U.S. As we use seven
nodes in Asia, six measurements from Israel fail to remain within region. Also, with
4 http://www.ip2location.com
5 http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm
Table 2. Geographical traffic locality in regions for network paths and application paths.
Traffic leaving region
Network Path Application Path
Region # Measurements # % TextSecure Threema WeChat WhatsApp
Europe 120 0 0% 100% 0% 100% 100%
Oceania 3 0 0% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Asia 28 6 21% 100% 100% 50% 100%
Americas 10 0 0% 0% 100% 100% 0%
South America 3 1 33% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Northern America 3 0 0% 0% 100% 100% 0%
two nodes in South America, the measurement between those two nodes leaves South
America for routing through North America. As the two in-country measurements stay
in the region, the 33% understate the effect, caused by the low number of nodes. As a
result we highlight that only Europe and North America feature at least one messenger
that keeps traffic local. Asia traffic for WeChat does not remain local because of Israel’s
aforementioned routing and also because of traffic from Singapore and Thailand being
routed to the Chinese WeChat servers through U.S. IXPs.
Table 3 shows how measurements from a specific region were subject to various
interest groups, both for the network path and for the specific application path:
Europe to Europe: 72% of network path measurements within Europe were ac-
cessible to 5 Eyes (by routing through UK). 98% of measurements were accessible to
the European Union, with only measurements internal to Switzerland and Norway not
being accessible. For application paths, Threema reduces the 5 Eyes access by 16% as
it effectively proxies traffic through Switzerland, which enforces continental routing for
some routes (e.g. Poland - Switzerland - Spain as compared to Poland - UK - Spain).
99% of WeChat measurements within Europe were accessible to 5 Eyes because of rout-
ing through the U.S. Only the Switzerland internal measurement offered a direct path to
Hong Kong. As Switzerland has a direct path to the U.S. as well, this also explains the
one case where EU can not access TextSecure messages. When using Threema within
Switzerland, the application path remains in Switzerland as well, hence the EU cannot
access those measurements.
Oceania to Oceania: As Australia and New Zealand are both members of 5 Eyes,
obviously all measurements are accessible to the latter. It is remarkable that all WeChat
traffic, e.g. generated by exile Chinese, is routed through China.
Asia to Asia: At a network level, both 5 Eyes, China and the European Union
can access about 20% to 40% of traces sent within Asia. This is largely caused by
the before mentioned Israel routing. 75% of Threema traffic is 5 Eyes accessible by
routing to Switzerland through the U.S. Also, a large portion of WeChat traffic (46%) is
accessible to 5 Eyes, both by Israel routing through the U.S. and by Singapore routing
to WeChat’s Chinese backend through an U.S. IXP.
North America to North America: As expected, 100% of traffic is 5 Eyes accessi-
ble. For Threema, traffic from Canada to Switzerland was again routed through a direct
hop from Miami to Zurich, resulting in two measurements seeming inaccessible to EU.
South America to South America: Measurements from Argentina were routed
through a direct tunnel from Miami to Zurich and hence were not accessible for the EU
in our metric. Hence only 2 out of 3 Threema measurements from South America are
accessible for the EU. However, South America’s communication is, independently of
the mobile messaging service being used, always susceptible to 5 Eyes.
Russia and Arab League: None of the measurements did traverse Russia or the
Arab League. We hence excluded those from the table.
Table 3. Accessibility of traffic for different jurisdictions.
Accessible for Jurisdiction
Juris- Network Path TextSecure Threema WeChat WhatsApp
Region diction #Total # % # % # % # % # %
Europe 5 Eyes 120 86 72% 120 100% 68 57% 119 99% 120 100%
Europe EU 120 118 98% 119 99% 119 99% 120 100% 120 100%
Europe China 120 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 120 100% 0 0%
Oceania 5 Eyes 3 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100%
Oceania EU 3 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0% 0 0%
Oceania China 3 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0%
Asia 5 Eyes 28 6 21% 28 100% 21 75% 14 50% 28 100%
Asia EU 28 6 21% 7 25% 18 64% 7 25% 7 25%
Asia China 28 10 36% 7 25% 7 25% 28 100% 7 25%
South America 5 Eyes 12 4 33% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100%
South America EU 12 0 0% 0 0% 2 67% 0 0% 0 0%
South America China 12 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0%
North America 5 Eyes 12 12 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100%
North America EU 12 0 0% 0 0% 2 67% 0 0% 0 0%
North America China 12 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0%
6 Summary and Conclusion
We conducted traffic locality measurements between 28 countries for four mobile mes-
saging services. We found those apps to heavily distort locality of traffic and hence dras-
tically widen the set of actors able to access it. With a few notable exceptions, e.g. when
using Threema in Switzerland, this has large negative impacts on the users’ privacy.
With this being the first study on this particular topic, we hope to raise user and opera-
tor awareness to the problem at hand. To conduct our measurements, we introduced the
MATAdOR framework to analyze messaging traffic characteristics on mobile phones. A
detailed overview over the MATAdOR framework can be found in [35]. We fully release
both the MATAdOR framework and the dataset produced in our measurements through
our website6. This enables future work to easily validate our results or do further anal-
ysis, such as deeper protocol analysis on the apps. Future work might also include
analysis of WeChat’s regional optimization within China, focus on restricted end user
connectivity to be able to conduct a similar study with peer-to-peer services like Bleep,
or further dissecting protocols of other mobile messaging services. Acknowledgments:
We thank Andreas Loibl for early access to his Measurement Proxy software.
References
1. R. Brandom. WhatsApp rolls out end-to-end encryption using TextSecure code.
https://www.theverge.com/2014/11/18/7239221/whatsapp-rolls-out-end-to-end-encryption-with-textsecure,
2014. Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
2. Daum Kakao. 2Q15 earnings report.
http://www.kakaocorp.com/upload resources/ir/siljeok/siljeok 20150813080737.pdf,
August 2015. Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
3. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Secure Messaging Scorecard.
https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard, 2014. Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
4. Facebook. Messenger at f8. http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/03/messenger-at-f8/,
March 2015. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
5. Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications Post and Railway.
Annual report 2014. Annual Report 2014, page 81, 2014.
6. P. Fiadino, M. Schiavone, and P. Casas. Vivisecting WhatsApp in Cellular Networks:
Servers, Flows, and Quality of Experience. In Traffic Monitoring and Analysis. 2015.
7. T. Frosch, C. Mainka, et al. How Secure is TextSecure? Technical report, 2014.
8. J. Golson. Apple fighting the US government over encrypted iMessages.
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/apple-fighting-the-us-government-on-turning-over-encrypted-imessages/,
2015. Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
9. Q. Huang, P. P. Lee, et al. Fine-Grained Dissection of WeChat in Cellular Networks.
10. B. Huffaker, M. Fomenkov, and k. Claffy. DRoP: DNS-based router positioning. ACM
SIGCOMM CCR, 44(3), 2014.
11. J. Koum. Whatsapp - now serving 900,000,000 monthly active users.
https://www.facebook.com/jan.koum/posts/10153580960970011, September 2015,
Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
12. Line Corporation. LINE Corporation Announces 2015Q2 Earnings.
http://linecorp.com/en/pr/news/en/2015/1043, Juli 2015. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
13. M. Marlinspike. A Saudi Arabia telecom’s surveillance pitch.
http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/, 2013. Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
14. L. McMurchy. Skype connection hub ads provide increased scale for marketers.
http://advertising.microsoft.com/en/blog/29331/skype-connection-hub-ads-provide-increased-scale-for-marketers,
December 2014. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
15. R. Mueller, Schrittwieser, et al. What’s new with WhatsApp & Co.? Revisiting the security
of smartphone messaging applications. In iiWAS, 2014.
16. K. P. O’Hara, M. Massimi, R. Harper, S. Rubens, and J. Morris. Everyday dwelling with
WhatsApp. In CSCW, 2014.
17. Open Whisper Systems. Textsecure, now with 10 million more users.
https://whispersystems.org/blog/cyanogen-integration/, Dec 2013, Accessed Sep. 23, 2015.
6 http://net.in.tum.de/pub/mobmes/
18. Pew Research Center. Mobile messaging and social media 2015.
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/08/Social-Media-Update-2015-FINAL2.pdf, 2015.
Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
19. PlanetLab Central. User tools. https://www.planet-lab.org/tools. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
20. R. Reader. Wickr CEO Nico Sell: behind the glasses.
http://venturebeat.com/2015/01/13/wickr-ceo-nico-sell-behind-the-glasses/, January 2015.
Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
21. Statista. Number of monthly active viber users. http://www.statista.com/statistics/316423/,
April 2015, Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
22. Statista. We are social. (n.d.). most popular global mobile messenger apps as of August
2015. http://www.statista.com/statistics/258749/, Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
23. Statista. Number of monthly active WhatsApp users worldwide.
http://www.statista.com/statistics/260819/number-of-monthly-active-whatsapp-users/,
Accessed September 23, 2015.
24. Tango. 200 million members! http://www.tango.me/blog/200-million-members, March
2014. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
25. TechCrunch. Chat app kik hits 200m registered users.
http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/28/dont-expect-kik-maus/, Jan 2015, Accessed Sep 23,
2015.
26. Tencent. 2015Q2 results.
http://www.tencent.com/en-us/content/ir/news/2015/attachments/20150812.pdf, August
2015. Accessed Sep 23, 2015.
27. The European Commission. Case No COMP/M.7217 - FACEBOOK/ WHATSAPP.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217 20141003 20310 3962132 EN.pdf,
2014.
28. The Telegram Team. Telegram reaches 1 billion daily messages.
https://telegram.org/blog/billion, December 2014. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
29. Threema. If you value security and privacy.
https://threema.ch/press-files/1 press info/Press-Info Threema EN.pdf, September 2014.
Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
30. TNS Global. The new social frontier: Instant messaging usage jumps 12%.
http://www.tnsglobal.com/press-release/new-social-frontier-instant-messaging-usage-jumps,
2015. Accessed Oct 7, 2015.
31. Vodafone. Law enforcement disclosure report 2015.
https://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/sustainability/law enforcement.html, 2015.
Accessed Sep 14, 2015.
32. M. Wa¨hlisch, T. Schmidt, et al. Exposing a nation-centric view on the German internet–a
change in perspective on AS-Level. In Passive and Active Measurement, 2012.
33. Wikipedia. Mobile application testing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile application testing#Some Mobile Application Testing Tools,
2015. Accessed Sep 17, 2015.
34. M. Zhang, Y. Ruan, V. S. Pai, and J. Rexford. How DNS Misnaming Distorts Internet
Topology Mapping. In USENIX, 2006.
35. J. Zirngibl. Security Analysis of Mobile Messaging Traffic with an Automated Test
Framework. Bachelor’s thesis, Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, 2015.
